Abstract: Fair exchange protocols play an important role in application areas such as e-commerce where protocol participants require mutual guarantees that a transaction involving exchange of items has taken place in a specific manner. A protocol is fair if no protocol participant can gain any useful advantage over honest participants by misbehaving. In addition, such a protocol is fault tolerant if the protocol can ensure no loss of fairness to an honest participant despite the occurrence of failures of the assumed type. Fault tolerant fair exchange protocols have not been studied adequately. This paper remedies the situation by systematically developing a family of fair exchange protocols for two participants under a variety of assumptions concerning participant misbehaviour, message delays and node failures. The treatment presented not only shows how a non-fault tolerant version of a protocol can be made fault tolerant, but also highlights the subtle relationships that exist between fairness and fault tolerance.
Introduction
Fair exchange protocols play an important role in application areas where protocol participants require mutual guarantees that an exchange of data items has taken place in a specific manner. An exchange is fair if a dishonest participant cannot gain any advantage over honest participants by misbehaving. Practical schemes for fair exchange require a trusted party that essentially plays the role of a notary in the paper based schemes. (Gradual Exchange protocols [BGMR90] which do not need a trusted party have high communication overhead.) Two-participant fair-exchange protocols that make use of a trusted third party have been studied extensively in the literature (e.g., [ZG97, , -97a, PSW98, ASW98]); these protocols maintain fairness even if the dishonest participant can tamper with the protocol execution in an unrestricted (malicious) manner. So far however, fault tolerant fair exchange protocols have not been studied adequately. A fair exchange protocol is fault-tolerant if it ensures no loss of fairness to an honest participant even if the participant's node experiences failures of the assumed type.
In this paper we develop a number of fair exchange protocols under a variety of assumptions concerning failures, misbehaviour and communication delays. Our development is systematic: we begin by classifying dishonest participants into restricted abusers (they cannot tamper with the protocol execution in an arbitrary manner) and unrestricted or malicious abusers, and communication model into synchronous and asynchronous; we develop the very first protocol under the most constrained set of assumptions: restricted abuser, synchronous communication and no fault tolerance. We then relax the restricted abuser assumption to malicious abuser and then the synchrony assumption into asynchrony. The resulting family of non-fault-tolerant fair exchange protocols is then transformed into a family of crash-tolerant protocols.
A major advantage of our approach is that it enables a reader to gain a deeper understanding of the impact of a given set of assumptions on the problem of fair exchange; it also highlights the relationships that exist between fairness, fault tolerance and communication delay assumptions. In particular, we show that the use of (optimistic) message logging for crash tolerance is more subtle than that suggested in [LNJ00] -the first paper to consider fault-tolerance and fair-exchange. We first describe the problem and the underlying system models (section 2), and then develop a family of non-fault-tolerant protocols (section 3), followed by their crash-tolerant counterparts (section 4). Section 5 identifies issues that need to be considered when message logging is used for crash tolerance and concludes the paper.
System Models and the Problem Description
We consider two mutually untrusting users, U A and U B , who want to exchange their items that are known only to the owners prior to the exchange: User U x , X ∈{A, B}, intends to send item I x in return for receiving I Y , where Y ∈{A, B} and Y ≠ X. We will use P x to denote the process that executes an exchange protocol on behalf of user U x on his node N x . Our distributed exchange system ( Figure 1 ) has a third node hosting the trusted third party (TTP) process. The exchange must preserve fairness as well as non-repudiation: a user gets irrefutable evidence of the actions performed by his process (to guard against the other user's false denial of the occurrence of an action or event). 
Classifying User Misbehaviour
Generally, the problem of fair exchange is addressed in a context where a dishonest user, say U B , totally controls the behaviour of P B and tries to undermine every attempt to ensure fairness and non-repudiation. We term those dishonest users as malicious abusers and distinguish such users from a class of restricted abusers: a dishonest user is said to be a restricted abuser if an obfuscated code remains unintelligible (a virtual black box) to him even after he has executed it in his node. Say, user U B is a restricted abuser and is given an obfuscated code Π B . By our definition, he cannot obtain the values of variables used in Π B through a trace analysis; if he modifies Π B to Π' B , any execution of Π' B either meets the specification of Π B or results in a crash. The definition does not however restrict U B 's ability to delay, block, inspect, or tamper with any message which an execution of Π B generates or is destined to receive.
Unfortunately, code obfuscation that can be guaranteed to be totally secure is impossible to achieve [BGI01] : there exists a non-zero probability that an obfuscated program ceases to be a virtual black box to an abuser. We assume that this probability is zero for a restricted abuser while code obfuscation is considered ineffective against a malicious user. Despite the impossibility result of [BGI01] , code obfuscation remains an active area of research (see [CT00] for a survey) and is sought by industries. For example, there is much interest in developing tamper proof computing subsystems by the industry led Trusted Computing Platform Alliance, TCPA [TCPA01] . So, we believe, considering the restricted abuser model here is appropriate; in particular, it exposes the benefits that can be obtained if one accepts the risk of obfuscation failure and provides a good starting point for protocol development.
Classifying Node Behaviour
A fair-exchange protocol is fault-tolerant if it ensures that fairness is preserved to an honest participant despite the participant's node suffers failures of the assumed type. In other words, an honest user does not suffer loss of fairness because of his node failures. We consider two types of behaviour for a user node:
Reliable: An honest user's node never fails. Crash-recovery: An honest user's node fails only by stopping to function (crash); it recovers within some finite (but unknown) time after a crash and may crash again after its recovery. An honest user's node has access to a stable store whose contents survive the node crash.
When a user node is regarded to be reliable, the cause of any node crash is attributed to the user who has misbehaved and is therefore not entitled to any fairness guarantee. This is the traditional view taken in TTP-based protocols (e.g., [ZG97, -97, -97a, PSW98, ASW98]) which are therefore not fault-tolerant (see [LNJ00] ). In line with the existing, non-fault-tolerant protocols, TTP is assumed to be reliable and secure against intrusions and Trojan horses.
Classifying Communication Delays
Communication between correctly functioning processes is resilient to network failures: tolerates message loss (by retransmission) and filters out corrupt messages (using encryption). A network intruder is assumed to be a restricted abuser: a message in transit is a black box to him; he cannot modify it and have it received at the destination. He can however block a message from reaching its destination. We consider two types of network abuse: abuser gives up blocking a given message after a known period of time or after some unknown time, leading to two models: in the synchronous model, correctly functioning processes can exchange messages within delays bounded by D which is a known constant; in the asynchronous model, D is unknown.
Properties of a fair exchange Protocol
A user is honest if his node satisfies all the reliability requirements of the protocol (e.g., node being reliable when the protocol assumes node reliability), and if he makes no attempt to modify the behaviour of a protocol process except through the permitted operations.
Termination: Any execution of the protocol terminates for an honest user. When an execution terminates for an honest user U X , it can be either a normal termination in which P X delivers I Y to U X or an exceptional termination where P X informs U X that the exchange is unsuccessful.
No_Loss_Of_Fairness: If P X of honest U X terminates exceptionally, U Y does not receive I X .
Non-repudiation: when P X delivers I Y to honest U X , it also provides irrefutable evidence against any false denial on I Y having been sent by U Y .
The above properties are met trivially if P A and P B terminate always exceptionally.
Non-Triviality:
If U A and U B are honest, both are guaranteed to have normal termination.
Non-triviality is easy to guarantee for the synchronous, non-fault-tolerant case. Honesty of both the users alone is not sufficient to guarantee normal termination in a given execution, in the crash-tolerant case and also in the asynchronous model. The reasons for this inability are as follows. In crash-recovery model, the bound on the time taken by an honest user node to recover from a crash is unknown and a dishonest user may never allow his node to recover. So, a correctly functioning process (of an honest user or TTP) that is waiting too long for a message from a user process cannot resolve whether the latter is honest and its message is unduly delayed due to a crash or is dishonest and is not going to transmit the expected message; similarly, in the asynchronous model, it cannot resolve whether the user process from whom a message is expected is honest and its message is still in transit or is dishonest and the message will not be transmitted at all 1 . Therefore, meeting the termination property would mean that protocol execution may have to terminate exceptionally even if both users are honest. So, non-triviality can only be guaranteed eventually if honest users are willing to re-execute the protocol after every exceptional termination and if certain favourable conditions prevail eventually. The favourable conditions are: there is an execution during which (i) user nodes do not crash, and (ii) message communication delays do not increase. Only (i) is needed for the combination of crash-recovery and synchronous communication, and only (ii) for the reliable user node and asynchronous communication combination.
Assumptions, Notations and the Exchange Preliminaries
In all our protocols, TTP, assumed to be secure and reliable, is used to set-up the context for, and to initiate, the actual exchange. We make the following additional assumptions.
A1:
Processing within correctly functioning nodes is synchronous: delays for task scheduling and processing are bounded by a known constant.
A2:
The clocks of TTP and functioning honest user nodes are synchronised to real-time within a known bound which, for simplicity, is assumed to be zero. A recovering node receives the current time from its user. 2.5.1. Notations M: a message; V A (V B ): procedure to verify if I A (I B ) satisfies its description advertised by U A (U B ). eK Z (M): encryption of M using symmetric key K of party Z ∈{A, B, TTP}; Sig X (M): signature of P X , X ∈{A, B}, on M using the private key of U X ; Sig TTP (M): TTP's signature on M. L: a label that identifies a given exchange; N: a large random number (nonce) generated securely by TTP to uniquely identify messages of a given execution of the protocol for a given exchange; and, H: one-way and collision-resistant hash function: it is not feasible to compute from H(N), N nor another N' such that H(N) = H(N'). Π x : contents of a message sent by TTP to P x to initate the exchange phase.
When a party Z ∈{A, B, TTP} sends a message M it also includes Sig Z (M) as the evidence of origin for M. A recipient accepts a received M only if the accompanying Sig Z (M) is found authentic. For brevity, we will not make the details of this verification explicit and a received message will only refer to a message received with an authentic evidence of origin; further the pair {M, Sig Z (M)} will simply be written as M which will be indicated by its significant fields.
Exchange Preliminaries
All our protocols are structured into two phases: the start-up phase followed by the exchange phase when the actual exchange of promised data items takes place. During the start-up phase, each user essentially commits himself to the TTP of his acceptance of the verification procedure supplied by the other user. More precisely, the users carry out the following three steps:
Step 0.1: Each user sends the verification procedure (with evidence of origin) for his data item to the other user: U A (U B ) sends V A (V B ) to U B (U A ).
Step 0.2: After receiving each other's messages of the previous step, users decide on a TTP to be used for the exchange and a (future) time T EX when TTP should initiate the exchange phase.
Step 0.3: U A sends to TTP the message: (-1, A, T EX , V B, rtt AB ). The first field is -1 when the protocol is executed for the first time for a given exchange; in subsequent executions, if any, the field will have label L that is decided by TTP (see below) to uniquely identify the exchange. The second field indicates the message origin, the fourth field is V B (with U B 's evidence of origin), and the fifth field rtt AB is U A 's estimation of the round trip time between N A and N B . Similarly, U B sends (-1, B, T EX , V A, rtt BA ) to TTP, where rtt BA is U B 's estimation of the round trip time between N A and N B .
Upon receiving messages sent in step 0.3, TTP verifies whether the first and the third fields are the same in both messages and the fourth fields have authentic evidence of origin. If so, TTP decides on a unique L for the exchange if the exchange is new; generates a nonce N for the exchange phase and records N in a variable active_run#(L)= N. It then sends to N A and Π B to N B which include the parameters L and N; they will be used to identify messages of a given execution. The nature and the complete contents of Π's sent by TTP will depend on the chosen combination of various assumptions discussed earlier, and will be explained in the next two sections which describe the exchange phase of the protocols.
Note that in step 0.2, an honest user, say, U A only has evidence to prove that V B originated from U B ; it has to trust that the V B it received can be effectively used to verify the item I B which it is yet to receive. The trust model is weak and can be strengthened by having each U X approach a trusted authority to have V X generated together with the authority's signature for V X . For example, if I B is a piece of software S, U B must approach a software licensing authority (trusted by U A ) who evaluates S against the advertised specification. If satisfied, the authority computes an evidence of evaluation E B = H(S); V B is then generated as a program which contains E B and the specification of S, and which evaluates the predicate E B = H(I) when invoked to verify a data item I. Similarly, if I A is an electronic cheque, V A should be generated by a trusted Bank. Note that the trusted authority's signature on V assures the other user that the verification procedure it has is an effective one to verify the item to be received.
Terminology
A protocol is said to keep TTP offline if it is possible for honest user processes to achieve normal termination without interacting with TTP after the exchange phase is initiated. Such a protocol is also called optimistic in the literature. If TTP is not off-line, it is said to be on-line. An on-line TTP is likely to have higher communication and message processing overhead.
A protocol is said to use a state-keeping TTP if it requires the TTP to be able to respond to messages from user processes for an unspecified amount of time; the protocol is said to use a state-relinquishing TTP if it requires the TTP only for a specified duration after the exchange phase has been initiated. From cost point of view, TTP is preferred to be offline and state-relinquishing.
Non-Fault-Tolerant Fair Exchange Protocols

Restricted Abuser, Synchronous Communication (P1) Protocol Principles and Outline
TTP sends an obfuscated code Π A to P A and Π B to P B . P A and P B perform the exchange phase of the protocol P1 by executing the obfuscated code given to them. Embedded in Π X are L, N, V X , ∆, and keys K A and K B , each with TTP's evidence of origin. ∆ is set to D, K A and K B are symmetric and random session keys. If a dishonest U X is only a restricted abuser as assumed, he cannot obtain K A and K B from Π X nor undetectably modify V X embedded within Π X . However, U X can delay, block, inspect, or tamper with any message P X generates or is destined to receive while it executes Π X .
On executing Π A , P A first verifies whether I A (input by U A ) passes V A embedded within Π A . Only if I A passes the verification, P A continues the execution: it encrypts the verified I A using K A and forms a message M A which, like all messages sent by P A , contains an evidence of origin generated using the private key of U A ; it then encrypts M A with K B and sends the encrypted M A to P B . P B decrypts the received M A with K B and validates the evidence of origin. (M A without valid evidence of origin is ignored and hence assumed not 'received' by P B .) If it receives M A it sends an acknowledgement Ack B (A) to P A . P B similarly sends M B to, and expects to receive Ack A (B) from, P A . The message exchange between P A and P B are depicted in Figure 2 , where a process sending a message shown along an out-going arrow is conditional upon that process having received the messages shown along incoming arrows. We will assume that P X , after receiving Π X and V X , execute both rounds concurrently: send M X and wait for Ack Y (X) while waiting for M Y before Ack X (Y) can be sent. Table 1 summarises the messages used and the intended direction of their flow. A message is indicated by its significant fields, the first three fields will be: the label L, the sender, and H(N). Note that the first and the third message fields uniquely refer to a given execution. Step T1: if it has received Req from both processes or Res from at least one process, it sets variable outcome = resolved and resolves the exchange sending M TTP (X) to both processes;
Step T2: if it has received Req from only one process, it sets outcome = aborted and aborts the exchange by sending Abort TTP (X) to both processes;
Step T3: if it has received no message, it sets variable outcome = unknown;
Step T4: it terminates as a state-relinquishing TTP.
An honest P A terminates normally by receiving either M B and Ack B (A) or M TTP (A); exceptionally by receiving Abort TTP (A). The code is shown in Appendix A1 where we argue that the four properties of fair-exchange stated in Section 2.4 are met based on the following: (i) dishonest user, say U B , is a restricted abuser, so he cannot force P B to deliver I A against the protocol conditions nor can he obtain K A and K B from Π B ; (ii) an honest P A sends Ack A (B) to P B only if it receives M B in a timely manner; (iii) any message that P A sends to TTP reaches before T L +4∆; and, (iv) TTP's response, if any, is identical to both P A and P B . 2. Π A does not contain K B means that P A cannot encrypt M A with K B (see Table 1 
Malicious
Correctness:
The arguments for termination and non-triviality remain the same as for P1 since they concern only honest user(s). We claim that the arguments for no-loss-of-fairness also hold, due to the following additional reason: honest P A releases key K A to P B only if it receives M B in a timely manner. The arguments for non-Repudiation are also the same for P1, except that the evidence of origin for K B may come from P B (in Ack B (A)) as well. Otherwise, fairness can only be guaranteed outside the system (e.g., court of Law) with the eventual cooperation from U B or through compensating U A -the least desirable form of enforcing fairness in the hierarchy defined in [VPG99] . One way to ensure (i) is to force the users to deposit their items and verification procedures with the TTP in the start-up phase itself; this will increase the responsibility of TTP which now needs to verify the deposited items. If U B is a restricted abuser, the above scenario cannot arise, as Π B is tamper-proof relative to the abilities of U B and therefore Π B can contain K A using which P B encrypts M B in P1. Since U B cannot obtain K A , he cannot modify M B to M' B and make P A accept M' B . Thus P1 automatically guarantees fairness within the exchange system itselfthe most desirable form of fairness enforcement.
Remark: Related Work: P1.1 is the same as the round-optimal contract-exchange protocol of [PSW98] which, like here, assumes a malicious abuser and a synchronous network, and provides no faulttolerance. The only difference is that the TTP of our protocol resolves the exchange if it receives Req messages from both the user processes within 4∆ time after initiating the exchange. Because of this difference, P1 and P1.1 can be easily modified to provide eventual non-trivial termination in the asynchronous model.
Restricted and Malicious Abusers, Asynchronous Communication (P1A and P1.1A)
Protocols P1 and P1.1 are not appropriate for the asynchronous model. Impossibility case: Say, both U A and U B are honest. Within 2∆ time after receiving Π from TTP, let P A receive M B and Ack B (A), and P B receive only M A because Ack A (B) was unduly delayed. Let Res B be delayed as well, so it does not reach TTP before T L + 4∆ by which time TTP stops responding to any message related to the execution. Honest P B has no fairness and also cannot terminate. This impossibility is not surprising as [PSW98] shows that, in the non-fault-tolerant case, there cannot be an asynchronous protocol that works with a TTP that is off-line and state-relinquishing, and goes on to present a protocol with an off-line and state-keeping TTP. We here present protocols P1A and P1.1A with an on-line and state-relinquishing TTP, by deriving them from P1 and P1.1 respectively. The derivation is simple: in round 2 (see figure 2), P X sends Ack X (Y) to TTP, not to P Y ; it then waits for either M TTP (X) or Abort TTP (X).
In the start-up phase, TTP should obtain round trip time (rtt) measurements with each P X (as rtt A and rtt B ) and estimate 2∆ = maximum{2∆, rtt A , rtt B , rtt AB , rtt BA }.
TTP:
when ( If honest users re-execute the protocol for a given exchange after every exceptional termination, nontriviality is guaranteed if there exists an execution in which the message transfer delays between P A , P B and TTP do not exceed the ∆ determined by TTP at the start of the exchange phase; i.e., if message transfer delays do not increase during an execution.
Crash-Tolerant Fair Exchange Protocols
This section develops crash-tolerant versions of the protocols of the previous section.
Restricted Abuser, Synchronous Communication (P2)
Two obvious extensions are necessary for protocol P1 to be crash tolerant. Pessimistic (synchronous) checkpointing: P X of an honest user logs every received message and check-points its state before the received message is processed. Thus, in fig. 2 , an honest P X must receive and log the messages of the incoming channels before it can send out a message. State-keeping TTP: TTP does not execute step T4; instead it continues to operate retaining the value of outcome computed at T EX +4∆ and responding to any message from P X with M TTP (X), Abort TTP (X) or Abort TTP (X), if outcome is resolved, aborted or unknown respectively.
Impossibility of making P1 Crash-tolerant
Even with the use of pessimistic logging and state-keeping TTP, P1 cannot become crash-tolerant even though the dishonest user can only be a restricted abuser. Before presenting the arguments, we first make the state-keeping TTP more inclined to resolving an exchange: so long as outcome remains undecided after T EX +4∆, TTP will execute steps T1 and T2 whenever it receives a message from a user process; once outcome is set to resolved or aborted, it responds to an incoming message with M TTP (X) or Abort TTP (X) respectively. Note that when TTP sets outcome to resolved or aborted, it is irreversible. Consider the following scenario. Let N A crash during the second round shown in figure 2 and before P A receives Ack B (A); that is, P A has logged I A , Π A , sending of M A , and M B . Let dishonest U B block all messages P A sent to P B but retains a copy of these incoming messages. P B , having received no message from P A within 2∆ time, will send Req B for which TTP will respond by setting outcome = aborted and sending Abort TTP (B). Say U B blocks Abort TTP (B) as well and crashes his node. The recovered P A will find itself in having received only M B and will send Res A which, say, reaches TTP after outcome was set to aborted; TTP's response will be to send Abort TTP (A) to P A . Let U B re-boot N B , delete Π B from stablestore, and adjust the clock to make it appear as if the exchange phase is being executed for the first time.
He replays the arrival of Π B and of the blocked messages of P A exactly at those instances when they arrived during the first execution. Since P B 'receives' both M A and Ack A (B), it delivers I A to U B .
Outline of Protocol P2
At the core of P1's inability to be crash tolerant is the fact that having both M A and Ack A (B) is a sufficient condition for P B to deliver I A without consulting TTP at all. To remedy this, we need to add one more round (shown in Fig. 4 ) to P1 which P X executes after having executed the first two rounds (concurrently) and check-pointed its state. (The code and correctness reasoning are given in Appendix A2.) In the third round, P A sends a second acknowledgement Ack Table 2 . Description of additional messages used in P2.
Malicious Abuser, Synchronous Communication (P2.1)
Protocol P2.1 is the same as P2, except that some of the messages used need to be changed: These protocols are obtained by making P1A and P1.1A crash-tolerant by having process P X pessimistically checkpoint its state (as in P2 and P2.1) before processing a received message and by making TTP state-keeping. The latter is done as follows: for any message received from P X after T EX + 4∆, TTP sends Ack Y (X) to P X if both Ack A (B) and Ack B (A) have been received before T EX + 4∆; otherwise it sends AbortTTP(X). Table 3 summarises the protocols' characteristics using notations: a dishonest user, (DU) who can be either a restricted abuser (RA) or a malicious abuser (MA), the communication delay model (C) can be synchronous (S) or asynchronous (As), faults tolerated (FT) can be none (No) or crash (Cr), and the TTP which can be either off-line (Off) or on-line (On), and either state-relinquishing (Sr) or state-keeping (Sk).
Summary
Note that P2 and P2.1 can be easily made asynchronous (see remark in section 4.2). Though P1 and P2 have the same structure and time/message overhead as P1.1 and P2.1 respectively, they guarantee that fairness is automatically enforced within the system. When DU is MA, fairness enforcement requires TTP to have powers to generate the items the dishonest user pledged to send or revoke the validity of the items sent to him; if TTP does not have such powers, fairness can only be enforced outside the exchange system e.g. through a court of law or through compensation. Note that the protocols leave honest user with irrefutable evidence that the dishonest user has cheated. 
Protocol
Related Work and Conclusions
Message Delay Model and on-line TTP vs. off-line TTP. Liu et. al.
[LNJ00] proposes a criterion for incorporating crash-tolerance into a non-fault-tolerant protocol by semantics-based message logging scheme which optimises the number of messages that need to be pessimistically (synchronously) logged. The proposed approach is claimed to work for both on-line and off-line TTP based protocols. To demonstrate the effectiveness of the approach, they have considered a protocol with an on-line and statekeeping TTP; this protocol is identical to our P1.1A except that the communication model is taken to be synchronous. In Section 4.1.1, we have shown that the synchronous, offline-TTP protocol P1 cannot be made crash-tolerant merely by pessimistic message logging even if TTP is state-keeping and a dishonest user is a restricted abuser. Another round of message exchange (see figure 4) between user processes was required. This illustrates that message logging alone cannot necessarily make a synchronous protocol crash-tolerant; if a non-fault-tolerant protocol keeps the TTP off-line (as P1 does), then whether the message delay model is synchronous or asynchronous is an important factor that must be considered. The claim that their approach is orthogonal to the underlying delay model (see section 6.2 of [LNJ00] ) is true only for online-TTP protocols, and does not hold when TTP is off-line.
TTP: On-line and state-relinquishing vs. state-keeping.
Can an online-TTP protocol be made crashtolerant simply through message logging, regardless of whether the delay model is synchronous or asynchronous? The answer depends on whether the non-fault-tolerant protocol keeps the TTP staterelinquishing or state-keeping. Our protocols P1A and P1.1A suggest that it is possible to design online-TTP protocols that keep TTP state-relinquishing even with asynchronous delays. In making them crashtolerant, we have to make the (on-line) TTP a state-keeping one (see P2A and P2.1A in Table 3 ). Thus, the answer to the above question is yes, provided the issue of state-relinquishing vs. state-keeping TTP is given due consideration.
Optimising the cost of message logging. The approach suggested by [LNJ00] is as follows. It defines the point of no return for a user process, and if the process would synchronously log all received messages before entering this point, then logging of other received messages can be done asynchronously. Their definition of point of no return suggests that there is one such point for each process (Section 3.2 of [LNJ00] ). We remark here that our protocol P2.1 without check-pointing and message logging is identical to the time-optimal protocol (scheme 3) of [PSW98] which is non-fault-tolerant, for the asynchronous delay model and does not guarantee non-triviality. Applying the proposed approach to make this protocol crash-tolerant does not work: the point of no return for honest P A turns out to be its sending M A to P B (see figure 2, round 1); suppose that N A crashes in round 3 (see figure 4) after P A has sent Ack 2 A (B) but before Ack B (A) and M B were to be logged by the asynchronous logging scheme; note that Ack 2 A (B) contains K A (see Section 4.2). Honest U A suffers loss of fairness, even if U B does not misbehave; to avoid loss of fairness, P A must also log all received messages before sending Ack B (A). It appears that some protocols can have multiple points at which pessimistic logging is essential. Given that the number of messages received by a user process in a given execution is small, attempts to minimise the overhead of logging may not be worth the effort after all; further, every message received (and logged) may be useful later in any dispute resolution.
Protocol P1: Restricted Abuser, Synchronous and non-fault-tolerant The Protocol
In presenting the protocol, we assume the use of a primitive timed-receive(M) which blocks until either M is received or an associated timer expires. We use receive(M) as the conventional blocking primitive. Both primitives return M only is M is received with authentic evidence of origin. The Boolean received(M) returns true if M has been obtained through one of these primitives. Procedure Terminate(M) is used to terminate the execution based on the contents of M: if M is an abort-token, execution is terminated exceptionally; otherwise normal termination results. The pseudo-code executed by P A is given below. That for P B can be obtained by inter-changing A and B. To make some useful observations, let us consider the state of P X at the end of part 1, i.e., when the concurrent threads of P X terminate, in a given execution. The state of P X at this instance of time is expressed in terms of the (Boolean) values the variables received(M Y ) and received(Ack Y (X)) evaluate at that time. P X can be in one of four states identified in Table A1 .1; e.g., S A (0,0) indicates the state of P A in which received(M B ) = false = received(Ack B (A)). Let us suppose that U A is honest and consider the states of P A and P B when they complete part1. The following observations can be made:
O1. If P A is in S A (0,0), then P B can be in either S B (0, 0) or S B (1, 0). Since P A has not received M B , it is not possible for received(Ack A (B)) to be true for P B , and hence P B cannot be in any of S B (*, 1), where * denotes either 1 or 0. Further, P A in S A (0,1) means that P B can only be in S B (1, 0). Note that P A sends Req A to TTP if it is in S A (0,*) (see case #3 of Fig. A1.1) . This means that if P A sends Req A , P B will not execute case #1 of its pseudo-code, i.e., will not terminate normally without receiving M TTP from TTP.
O2.
P A in S A (1,0) implies that P B can be in any one of the four states S B (*,*). When P A is in S A (1,0) it sends Res A to TTP (see case #2 of Fig. A1.1) 
Protocol for TTP
TTP initiates the exchange phase at its clock time T EX by sending obfuscated code Π A (Π B ) which is executed by P A (P B ). As stated earlier, Π X is embedded with L, N, V X , ∆, and keys K A and K B . ∆ is set to D for protocol P1. At its clock time T EX + 4∆, TTP terminates (state-relinquishing) after resolving or aborting the exchange or sending no further message if no message is received from any user process since T EX . Figure A1 .2 presents the pseudo-code. 
Protocol Properties:
Let us fix U A to be honest throughout this subsection. We will assume that the instructions are executed in zero time. (This means that ∆ needs to be increased appropriately.) Let us suppose that P A received Π A at time T A as per the TTP's clock; so, T A < T EX + D. The concurrent threads of P A set the timer to 2∆. So, any of P A 's messages to TTP, must have been received by TTP before T A + D + 2∆ < T EX + 4∆. This means that when P A sends Req A or Res A to TTP, it must receive a response from TTP within a finite time.
Termination: P A sets the timer for 2∆ when it expects to receive a message from P B . Hence, it does not wait for ever. Any message it sends to TTP reaches TTP before T EX + 4∆. Hence P A must terminate the exchange phase within a bounded time.
No Loss of Fairness: If P A terminates abnormally, U B cannot receive I A so long as the obfuscation of Π B is effective against a dishonest U B .
Suppose that P A terminates exceptionally. This means that P A cannot have sent Res A to TTP; if it had, TTP would have received that Res A before its clock time T EX + 4∆ and responded with M TTP (A). Therefore, P A must have sent Req A and received an abort from TTP. The observation O1 indicates that P B cannot terminate normally without receiving M TTP (B) from TTP. The code for TTP indicates that if TTP sends abort to P A , it also sends abort to P B . Therefore, P B of honest U B terminates exceptionally. Say, U B is dishonest and P B receives M A . Since obfuscation of Π B is effective, U B cannot make P B compute I A from the received M A without the protocol conditions having been satisfied, nor can U B guess the keys K A and K B . So, U B does not receive I A .
Non-Triviality: Suppose that both U A and U B are honest. Let P A and P B receive Π A and Π B at TTP's clock time T A and T B respectively. Since clocks of TTP, P A and P B are assumed to be perfectly synchronised (assumption A2), T EX ≤ T X < T EX + D, X ∈ {A, B}; i.e., T A -T B  < D; further, T X is also the local clock time when P X begins executing the received Π X . When P A sends M A at T A , M A is received at N B before T A + D but P B cannot receive M A before T B when it starts executing the received Π B . Since T B < T A +D, P B must receive M A no later than T A + D < T B + 2D = T B + 2∆. P B sends Ack B (A) immediately after receiving M A . So, P A must receive Ack B (A) before T A + 2D = T A + 2∆. This means that the concurrent threads of both P A and P B will have timed-receive() returning the expected message. So, with TTP being kept off-line, U A and U B are delivered of the other's item.
Non-Repudiation:
If P A obtains M B from M TTP , then it has evidence of origin provided by the TTP; otherwise, it has P B 's evidence of origin for M B . It also has TTP's evidence for K A and K B using which it computes I B from M B . Note that the Boolean variables resolved, aborted A , and aborted B are stable predicates: once they become true, they remain true forever during an execution. Important points to note are: a distinct aborted variable is maintained for each P X , and TTP's response to a First_Acks X received depends on whether aborted X is true or not. They are used in correctness arguments below.
Protocol Properties:
It is easy to see that P2 meets the termination, non-repudiation and non-triviality guarantees, if the assumption on D (same as ∆) holds. We will show that it also preserves the No_loss_of_fairness property despite crashes of an honest user node. Suppose that U A is honest and P A terminates exceptionally. We will argue that U B could not have received I A so long as obfuscation of Π B is effective; i.e., U B cannot influence the behaviour of P B nor deduce K A and K B embedded in Π B . Let us first make two observations: (i) P A logs every received message before it acts; so, Booleans received(M B ) and received(Ack B (A)) are stable predicates despite intervening crashes of N A : once they become true, they remain true in a given execution; and, (ii) it check-points its state before it begins executing part 2 of its code. So, the messages it sends to TTP are all of the same type (Req A , Res A , or First_Acks A ) irrespective of any number of node crashes that may occur when it executes part 2 of its code. P A can terminate exceptionally only by receiving an abort token from the TTP in response to its sending Req A , Res A , or First_Acks A . Say, P A sent Req A . This means that it is in S A (0, *) when it began part 2 of its code. This means that P B cannot be in S B (1,1) to be able to produce and send First_Acks B to the TTP. When Req A reached TTP, resolved must be false; that is, the TTP had not earlier resolved the exchange nor will resolve it in response to receiving Req B in future. Further, when TTP sends the abort token, it sets the aborted A to true which is never set back to false. Therefore, TTP will not resolve any of P B 's Res B in future. So, P B cannot deliver I A to U B .
Say, P A sent Res A . When Res A reached the TTP, aborted B must be true, otherwise, the TTP would have resolved the exchange. This means that P B had already been given an abort token, and that the TTP's response for any future First_Acks B will be an abort token as well. Suppose that P A sent First_Acks A . When TTP receives First_Acks A , aborted A must already be true. The code of TTP indicates that if TTP sets aborted X to true, then it must have received Req X or Res X . We have shown that P A checkpointing its state at the end of part 1 of its code forbids it from sending Req A or Res A and then First_Acks A . So, if P A terminates exceptionally, it could not have sent First_Acks A to TTP.
